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Abstract: Information often distorts during the
process of transmission in a social network, which is
very common in many real-life applications. In this
paper, we study the problem of maximizing the infor-
mation authenticity of a social network. We propose
a new model to characterize information distortion
during the diffusion of influence. In order to trade
off between optimality and complexity, we design a
framework of greedy algorithms. Finally, we carry
out a numerical experiment to show the effectiveness
of the proposed algorithms.
Keywords: social networks; information distor-
tion; information authenticity; stochastic simulation;
greedy algorithm.
§1 Introduction
A social network is a general graphic model that
characterizes the relationships of a group of individ-
uals. Social networks have been studied for many
years in different areas, such as epidemiology [9], so-
ciology [15, 35, 36], economics [4, 14, 16, 25, 31, 34],
and computer science [3, 6, 8, 13, 18, 19, 24, 26, 30].
Recently, the research of information and influence
transmission through social networks has attracted
a lot of attention [6, 8, 26], which can provide sug-
gestions for solving multitudinous problems in real
life. Generally, practical problems where informa-
tion transmission in social networks is involved can
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usually be modeled as optimization problems with
various objectives, such as maximizing the amount of
individuals who will receive the information [19, 20],
maximizing the expected lift in the profit yielded by
the information transmission [8, 30], minimizing the
size of the initial target set of individuals such that
the information is guaranteed to be transmitted to
everyone in the network [6], minimizing the duration
of information transmission until all individuals re-
ceive the information [28, 29].
In practice, we find that information usually
changes during the process of transmission for some
reasons, so it would be not the same as what it origi-
nally is, that is, information distortion happens. For
example, by word of mouth, the most primitive way
of information transmission, it is almost impossible
to keep the spread information precise all the way.
The game named “Happy Fax” provides good evi-
dences, in which a number of people stand in a line
and transmit a piece of message one by one. Except
the one standing at the end of the line who read the
message from a paper card, everyone hears the mes-
sage from only the one behind her. Everyone tells
the message to only the one in front of her, except
the one at the head who will report what she thinks
the message is. The game is usually funny because it
is almost always that what the last one reports is to-
tally different from what the message really is. For
other popular online social networks such as Face-
book, information distortion still happens. Although
original message will stay the same all the way, due
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to the function of “share”, users can still add their
own comments to the message, which will influence
other users’ understanding of the message when it is
passed on and thus will lead to information distor-
tion.
Although information distortion indeed exists
in information transmission through social networks,
the works mentioned above focus on only optimizing
the process of information transmission, and none of
them discusses information distortion in the trans-
mission process. Information distortion has been
widely studied in areas such as accounting [7], supply
chain management [1, 21, 23, 27, 37], decision mak-
ing [10, 32, 33], organization management [2, 5, 22].
However, to our best knowledge, little attention has
been paid to information distortion in the area of
information transmission in social networks. In this
paper, we study the information distortion in infor-
mation transmission through social networks.
The main reason for information distortion is
due to the uncertainties in human communication,
such as the vagueness in expression by human lan-
guage and the diversity of the understanding of in-
formation. In the game of “Happy Fax”, because all
the players express the message in their own words,
errors in expression accumulate and large difference
is yielded. In on-line social networks such as Face-
book, subjective comments are added to the original
message continuously, which results in different un-
derstanding of different users and thus leads to dis-
tortion. Another reason for information distortion
is the oblivion that results from memory loss of hu-
man beings as time passes. One may not be able
to express the message clearly enough, if the dura-
tion between the time she receives a message and the
time she transmits it to others. In view of the above,
we define a model to describe information distortion
that incorporates the above two reasons for informa-
tion distortion, and introduce the concept of informa-
tion authenticity to describe the degree of distortion.
Information authenticity is set as a real number be-
tween 0 and 1, which roughly measures the extent
to which the information stays as what it originally
is. The information authenticity of a piece of pre-
cise information is 1, while the authenticity of the
information that is totally different from the original
one is set as 0. As highly distorted information is
meaningless for decision making, we set a threshold
between 0 and 1, such that information with authen-
ticity under the threshold is viewed as invalid and is
not taken into account.
In this paper, we focus on the following decision-
making problem: how to find a fixed number of nodes
in a social network, to whom a piece of information
is initially sent such that the information transmis-
sion with the minimum information distortion is trig-
gered off. Such a problem is of great practical sig-
nificance. For example, an environmental protection
organization may want to advertise for a new low-
carbon lifestyle through a social network by exploit-
ing the word-of-mouth effect. With limited budget,
the organization may have to advertise to only a lim-
ited number of individuals rather than all the people
in the social network. Information distortion may be
out of control of the organization, however its aim is
to minimize the distortion.
In this paper, in order to solve such a decision-
making problem, we adopt the incremental chance
model [28] to characterize how information trans-
mits. By measuring the information distortion by
information authenticity, we aim at maximizing the
total information authenticity of the valid informa-
tion when information transmission finishes. We de-
sign a series of greedy algorithms in which different
heuristic functions are embodied in order to allevi-
ate computational burden. A numerical experiment
is performed to show that the proposed algorithms
can flexible trade off between optimality and com-
plexity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
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lows. In Section 2, we propose the concept of in-
formation authenticity and present a new model on
basis of the incremental chance model to character-
ize information distortion during information trans-
mission. Section 3 describes a series of greedy al-
gorithms. We perform a numerical experiment in
Section 4 to show the performance of the proposed
algorithms. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
§2 Information Distortion
In this section, we review the incremental
chance model, present the concept of information au-
thenticity, and describe how information distorts in
a social network.
We denote a social network by an undirected
graph G = (N,E,W ). We let N be the set of nodes
in G, in which each node corresponds to an individ-
ual in the population we consider. Throughout this
paper, we denote by n the number of nodes in N .
Let E denote the set of edges, in which the edge con-
necting any pair of nodes i and j can be written as
either (i, j) or (j, i). Let W denote the weight func-
tion which assigns a positive weight to each edge to
measure the relationship between the corresponding
individuals the edge connects. For any edge (i, j),
the associated weight W (i, j) quantifies the relation-
ship between node i and node j. A node j is called
a neighbor of a node i, if there exists an edge (i, j)
in E. We denote by N(i) the set of neighbors of i.
In real life, information arrives at an individual
usually at random. The chance one receives a piece of
transmitted information in a given period of time is
actually the probability that she meets and commu-
nicates about the information with her friends who
have already known the information. Such a prob-
ability is believed to be proportional to the number
of the individual’s friends who have received the in-
formation and also to depend on how close friends
they are. On the basis of the above observations, we
assume that information transmits stochastically ac-
cording to the incremental chance model [28]. At any
time, nodes are categorized into two classes: active
nodes who have received the transmitted information
and thus are able to pass it to her neighbors, and
inactive nodes who have not yet received the infor-
mation. Each inactive node has a chance of turning
active only if she has an active neighbor. The proba-
bility that an inactive node i receives the information
at time t is defined by
pit =
∑
j∈Nat (i)
W (i, j)∑
j∈N(i) W (i, j)
,
where Nat (i) is the set of i’s active neighbors at time
t. Specifically, the probability that an inactive node
i gets the information from her neighbor j at time t
is


W (i, j)∑
k∈N(i)
W (i, k)
, if j is active at time t,
0, otherwise.
In the problem considered in this paper, we give the
information directly to a given number of nodes at
the very beginning. The set of nodes that we tar-
get, denoted by S, is set as the information source
that will trigger off the information transmission.
Throughout the paper, we denote by k the number of
nodes in S. Throughout the process of information
transmission, the value of pit for each node i increases
as time goes on until it becomes 1. The incremental
chance model has been proved to have all the indi-
viduals in the social network receive the transmitted
information with probability 1 [28].
We denote by ti the time step when the trans-
mitted information arrives at node i. We are par-
ticularly interested in how much of the transmitted
information has not distorted from what it originally
is until it has been received by each node. Therefore,
the information authenticity of each node i is defined
as a real number a(i) in interval [0, 1], which mea-
sures the extent to which the information received
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by i at ti stays the same with the original. It is no-
ticeable that the information authenticity is defined
for only active nodes. According to Ebbinghaus [11],
the information with only a very small authenticity
is naturally viewed as unreliable, thus we define a
threshold τ to indicate the level of reliability of the
transmitted information and consider the informa-
tion with an authenticity smaller than τ as invalid.
Based on the threshold τ , we further classify active
nodes at any time step t into two classes: valid nodes
whose information authenticity a(i) ≥ τ and invalid
nodes whose information authenticity a(i) < τ .
As information distortion almost always hap-
pens, we believe that the information authenticity
decreases while information transmits in a social net-
work for the following two reasons: (1) Due to the
uncertainties in human communication, authenticity
decreases when information passes from one individ-
ual to another. (2) Because of memory loss, authen-
ticity naturally decreases as time passes by. In order
to explain how the above two reasons are taken into
account in our model, we assume that node i gets the
information, at time ti, from her neighbor j who got
the information at tj . It is notable that tj is earlier
than ti, which means that ti − tj ≥ 1. When the
information transmits from j to i, we assume that
i’s information authenticity will decrease by a fixed
rate of γ ∈ (0, 1) due to the communication uncer-
tainties. If we take only such communication uncer-
tainties into account, the receiver’s information au-
thenticity is 1 − γ times that of the sender. On the
other hand, to reflect how memory loss affects in-
formation authenticity, we assume that authenticity
diminishes by a fixed rate of δ ∈ (0, 1) as each unit of
time passes by. Since memory loss will never happen
for the case of immediate transmission, information
authenticity will not decrease when ti − tj = 1. For
cases where ti − tj > 1, a(i) will be equal to a(j)
times (1− δ)ti−tj−1, if communication uncertainties
are not taken into account. By combining together
both the factor of communication uncertainties and
that of memory loss, the authenticity of node i is
given as
a(i) = a(j)× (1− γ)× (1 − δ)ti−tj−1.
For each node i in the target set S in the prob-
lem we consider, we set her associated information
authenticity a(i) = 1 and let the time when she re-
ceives the information ti = 0. This assumption is
natural because, as the information source, the nodes
in S get the information directly without any distor-
tion at the very beginning. It is noticeable that, for
each node who has received the information, there is
a chance that she may hear of the information again,
perhaps from another neighbor. The late receipt of
the information may update the authenticity that we
have already assigned to the node. We presume that
γ = δ, such that late receipt of the transmitted infor-
mation will not lead to a higher authenticity. There-
fore, we can focus on the information authenticity
that is initially assigned to each node.
According to Ebbinghaus [11], only information
with high authenticity is reliable, thus we focus on
only the valid nodes whose authenticity is higher
than τ . In summary, the problem we consider in this
paper is to find a set S consisting of a fixed number
k of nodes such that the expected sum of the authen-
ticities associated with all valid nodes is maximized.
Formally, we aim at solving the problem
max
|S|=k
E [σ(S)] = max
|S|=k
E

 ∑
a(i)≥τ,i∈N
a(i)

 .
§3 A Framework of Greedy Algo-
rithms
In this paper, given a connected social network
G and a positive integer k, we focus on the problem
of finding and targeting a set of nodes S consist-
ing of k nodes, such that the expected total infor-
mation authenticity E[σ(S)] is maximized. A diffi-
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culty we face first is the lack of the analytical expres-
sion of E[σ(S)]. In order to deal with this problem,
we adopt the stochastic simulation technique to esti-
mate E[σ(S)] as follows [12]: we independently gen-
erateM samples {ω1, . . . , ωM} and estimate E[σ(S)]
by
∑M
i=1 σ(S)(ωi)/M . To our knowledge, real social
network is large-scale, such that n, the number of
nodes in the network, is usually a large value. The
problem we consider in this paper is difficult because
we attempt to find the optimal one among all Cnk pos-
sible sets of nodes, which is quite time-consuming. In
addition, the time spent on stochastic simulation is
also considerable, because the number of samples in
simulation is required to be large to reduce estima-
tion error. In this section, we design a framework
of greedy algorithms to provide a flexible trade-off
between performance and efficiency.
§3.1 The Framework
As we mentioned, in real-life applications, Cnk is
such a large number that it is not practical to em-
ploy brute-force search to solve the problem. In this
view, we propose a framework of greedy algorithms
by which a set of nodes is constructed incrementally.
A greedy algorithm puts the nodes in the target set
once a time, where each node we pick and add to the
set is believed to lead to the best performance of the
solution. Under the framework, greedy algorithms
distinguish from each other by providing different
ways of determining the node that is added to the
set at each step.
The traditional greedy algorithm in the frame-
work is named the value-based greedy algorithm, in
which a node is added to the target set only if doing
so leads to the largest increase of the value of ob-
jective function. Although the performance of the
value-based greedy algorithm is relatively impres-
sive, it suffers from the complexity of implementing
stochastic simulation for a large number of times,
which limits its scalability.
The other extreme in the framework is called the
heuristic-based greedy algorithm, where we adopt a
heuristic function to evaluate, at each step of the
algorithm, the fitness of putting each node to the
target set, and then pick the one with the highest
fitness. This type of greedy algorithm indeed saves
computational time because the heuristic functions
are computationally cheap, however the performance
is usually dissatisfactory.
In order to trade off between the value-based
greedy algorithm and the heuristic-based greedy al-
gorithm, we introduce an integer parameter r. At
each step of the algorithm, we first evaluate the fit-
ness of adding each node to the target set by some
heuristic function and record the r nodes with the
highest fitness; then by adopting stochastic simula-
tion for evaluating the value of objective function,
we add the node, among the r nodes, to the current
target set if doing so results in the largest increase
of the total authenticity.
Table 1 presents the algorithm framework.
Given a social network G, the size of target set k,
the trade-off parameter r and a heuristic function h,
the algorithm returns a target set S. When r = 1,
the algorithm is a heuristic-based greedy algorithm
with heuristic function h; when r is set to be depen-
dent on l as r(l) = n− l, it becomes the value-based
greedy algorithm.
§3.2 Heuristic Function
Before we introduce the details of the heuristic
functions, we first propose the concept of the dis-
tance network of a social network. The distance net-
work is exactly the same with the original social net-
work except that the weight function is replaced with
one that characterizes the distances between nodes.
Base on the weight function W in the original so-
cial network, we present the following alternatives of
setting the weight function in the distance network.
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Table 1 A Framework of Greedy Algorithms
Input: G,k,r,h;
Output: S;
S = ∅;
l = 0;
while l < k
R = ∅;
c = 0;
while c < r
ic = argmaxi∈N\(S∪R) h(S, i);
R = R ∪ {ic};
c = c+ 1;
ir = argmaxi∈R(E[σ(S ∪ {i})]− E[σ(S)]);
S = S ∪ {ir};
l = l + 1;
return S;
• W r(i, j) = 1
W (i,j) , whose reciprocal is the
weight function in the original social network.
• W o(i, j) = max
(i′,j′)∈E
W (i′, j′) −W (i, j), where a
positive value is added to the opposite of W to
keep the weights non-negative.
At each step of the greedy algorithms, given the
current set of nodes S ⊂ N and any node i /∈ S, a
heuristic function returns the fitness h(S, i) of adding
i to S. In this section, we propose three heuristic
functions. The idea of the first two heuristic func-
tions is to define the fitness of each node by its cen-
trality. Different measures of centrality have been
developed [17], each of which captures a particular
aspect of how “important” the role a node plays in
transmitting the information. The idea of the third
heuristic function is to select nodes that are likely to
get the transmitted information late, because delay
in the receipt of the information may lead to large
distortion.
§3.2.1 Degree Centrality (DC)
The degree centrality of a node is defined by its
degree, i.e. the number of its neighbors. So we define
the first heuristic function as
h1(S, i) = |N(i)|.
Intuitively, we treat a node with large degree cen-
trality as a social individual.
§3.2.2 Closeness Centrality (CC)
The closeness centrality of a node is defined as
the inverse of the sum of the distances between the
node and the other nodes. Note that the closeness
centrality is defined on the distance network. As the
weights on the distance network are all non-negative,
a shortest path between any pair of nodes i and j
exists. We denote the length of the shortest path
from i to j by SPL(i, j). By defining the value of the
second heuristic function as the closeness centrality
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of i, we have
h2(S, i) =
1∑
j 6=i,j∈N SPL(i, j)
.
§3.2.3 Maximin Path Length Reduction
(MPLR)
By this heuristic function, we aim to put “the
farthest point” in the target set in order to reduce in-
formation distortion by shortening the duration the
information transmits. For any node i and a cur-
rent target set S, we can define the distance be-
tween i and S in the distance network as SPL(S, i) =
minj∈S SPL(j, i). The maximin path length associ-
ated with S is defined as maxj∈N SPL(S, j). Given
a node i and the current target set S, we let the
value of the heuristic function be the reduce of the
maximin path length if we add i to S, i.e.
h3(S, i) = max
j∈N
SPL(S, j)−max
j∈N
SPL(S ∪ {i}, j).
§4 Numerical Experiment
In this section, we perform a numerical experi-
ment to show the effectiveness and robustness of the
proposed algorithm framework. In the experiment,
social networks are generated randomly. In order
to construct a network, we set the number of nodes
N = 100 and predetermine a parameter p as the
probability of connecting any pair of nodes with an
edge. The parameter p roughly indicates the density
of the edges in the network. If p is close to 1, every
node is connected to almost all the other nodes; while
if p is small, the edges in the network are sparse and
each node is connected to only a few of other nodes.
After the network is generated, we will check whether
the generated network is connected. If the generated
network is not connected, we add as few edges as
possible to make it connected. In the numerical ex-
periment, we set p = 0.002 to generate the social
networks. For each edge, we randomly generate an
integer weight ranging from 1 to 5. The number of
samples M is set to 5000 in the stochastic simula-
tion. The experiment is performed on a Pentinum4
PC.
In the first experiment, we consider the results
of a series of greedy algorithms with different heuris-
tic functions, different weight functions in the dis-
tance network and different trade-off parameter r.
Here, we set k = 8. By using the greedy algorithms,
the results of the expected total information authen-
ticity and the runtime are shown in Figure 1 and 2,
respectively. In Figure 1 and 2, there are two ex-
treme cases of r. When r = 1, the greedy algorithm
is the heuristic-based greedy algorithm, and stochas-
tic simulation is avoided; while when r = |N |− t, the
greedy algorithm is the value-based greedy algorithm
without using any heuristic function.
As shown in Figure 1, for all the greedy algo-
rithms, the expected total information authenticity
E[σ(S)] increases with r increasing. Especially, when
r is relatively small, E[σ(S)] is improving fast as r
increases. Besides, it is clear that heuristic func-
tion of “DC” generates worse results than the other
two heuristic functions. In general, the weight func-
tion W o turns out to produce better solutions than
the weight function W r when we set the heuris-
tic function as “CC” or “MPLR”. Figure 2 shows
that the runtime of the greedy algorithms increases
as r increases, because stochastic simulation takes
more computational time for a large value of r. We
can find that, compared to heuristic functions of
“MPLR” and “CC”, “DC” consumes a little more
time for each setting of r. By combining both Fig-
ure 1 and Figure 2, we find that by properly setting
the value of r, we can flexibly trade off between op-
timality and complexity by the framework of greedy
algorithms we propose.
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§5 Summary
In this paper, we have studied the problem of
maximizing the information authenticity of a social
network. A new model has been proposed to describe
the distortion of information when it diffuses through
a social network. We have proposed a framework
of greedy algorithms where different heuristic func-
tions can be integrated in order to make a balance
of solution performance and computational cost. We
have performed a numerical experiment to show the
proposed algorithms can flexibly trade off between
optimality and complexity.
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